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Abstract 
This paper investigates the importance of economic integration in simultaneously fostering foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and international trade. These have rarely been analyzed jointly using 
contemporary econometric methods. We estimate the effect of European Union (EU) membership on 
FDI inflows and trade using annual bilateral data from 34 OECD countries over 1985–2013. We find 
that EU membership increases FDI inflows by on average 28%. We jointly estimate the impact of EU 
membership on trade and FDI and find that they are substantial, with the one on trade larger than the 
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1. Introduction
This paper investigates the importance of deep economic integration in jointly fostering foreign 
investment and international trade for the participating members. Discussions about economic 
integration have tended to focus on trade, though its potential impact on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) is also becoming increasingly recognized (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 
2003; 2004). Thus, while economic integration is often thought of as a conduit for international 
trade, recent developments have shown it is also a powerful force in FDI terms (Blomstrom 
and Kokko 2003; Egger and Pfaffermayr 2004). However, while the determinants and effects 
of FDI are well established in the economics literature (Helpman et al., 2004; Javorcik, 2004; 
Haskel et al., 2007), there is much less analysis of how FDI inflows are affected by international 
integration experiences; a conspicuous lacuna concerns the evolution of the European Union. 
In fact, it is likely that European Union integration has played an important role in fostering 
FDI, both between member economies and with the rest of the world, as indicated by the impact 
of announcements about future EU membership on FDI into transition economies in the 1990s 
(Bevan and Estrin, 2004).  
Our aim in this paper is to use frontier estimation methods to provide the best possible 
measures of the effects of economic integration on FDI and on both trade and FDI together. 
Our focus on estimation methods, particularly concerning FDI, is motivated by recent 
developments in the literature on the trade effects of deep economic integration. Notably, Glick 
and Rose (2015) find that earlier estimates Glick and Rose (2002) of the positive impact of 
currency unions on trade are not supported when subject to modern econometric techniques. 
Our findings also provide an indication of the possible effect of EU exit on FDI for a current 
member, as is likely to occur given the 2016 referendum vote by the UK.  
Our analysis is based on the gravity model, a “work-horse” of the empirical international 
trade literature (Anderson, 2011). The gravity model has been successfully applied to explain 
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most forms of bilateral cross-border flows, including trade, migration, and foreign direct 
investment in terms of the relative size and distance between countries and/or regions (Baldwin 
and Taglioni, 2011; Head and Mayer, 2014). A country’s economic size is expected to have a 
positive effect on bilateral flows while distance is expected to have a (nonlinear) negative 
effect. Distance is often measured geographically but is usually taken to reflect a whole range 
of transactional and frictional costs associated with differences in regulations, tariff and non-
tariff barriers as well as language and culture (North, 1991; Ghemawat, 2001). The gravity 
model therefore highlights the large potential for trade and FDI between relatively large 
economies which are close together geographically. The last two decades have witnessed 
enormous research progress in the economic application of gravity models including Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003) and Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). The resulting new structural 
gravity approach (Fally, 2015) provides the necessary theoretical underpinnings as well as 
strong support for the econometric estimation of gravity models.   
We estimate our structural gravity model using data for 34 OECD countries between 1985 
and 2013 for bilateral FDI flows, bilateral distance, GDP and GDP per capita (for sender and 
target countries) and the shares of manufacturing output, exports and imports in total GDP. Our 
data represent more than 70% of global FDI flows and, because the countries are all OECD 
members, they are collected in a homogenous manner and are of uniform and relatively high 
quality. However, they exclude most developing countries including China and India, which 
play an increasing role in global FDI especially after 2000 (Rugman, 2009). This is a limitation 
to which we return in the conclusions.  
We find that, between 1985 and 2013, EU membership led FDI inflows to be greater  by 
about 28%. We use a variety of econometric techniques and sensitivity analyses in order to 
ensure the robustness of our findings, including dynamic estimation, lags, stock rather than 
flow measures of FDI, and addressing selection issues. Our estimates of the impact of deep 
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economic integration via EU membership endorse FDI as a channel (in addition to trade) for 
possible payoffs from deep integration. The effect of EU membership on FDI is always 
estimated to be positive, ranging by estimation method from 14% (Heckman) to 33% (OLS) to 
38% (Poisson estimates). Furthermore, when the impact of EU membership on trade and FDI 
are estimated jointly using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) methods, the impact on FDI 
is again found to be positive and falling within the previously estimated range while the effect 
on trade is also positive and approximately twice as large.  
2. FDI, Trade and the European Union: A Conceptual Framework
In this section, we propose a conceptual framework to consider the potential effects of 
economic integration on trade and FDI. The distinction between shallow and deep integration 
is useful in this case: shallow integration is epitomized by the free trade area model and is 
restricted to economic integration, while deep integration combines economic and political 
aspects (Campos et al., 2015). An important case of deep integration is the customs union in 
which economic ties are supported by the creation of common institutions to manage conflict 
which may emerge, for instance, regarding the common external tariff. The European Union 
represents perhaps the most sophisticated example of deep integration.  
2.1 The Literature 
The changing nature of international trade is also worthy of note for our understanding of FDI 
(Baldwin, 2016). Traditionally, international trade was understood to be driven by the 
exploitation of mutual comparative advantage, implicitly focusing on final products. However, 
in the last two or three decades, international trade has in fact increasingly involved the 
exchange of parts and components within firms and industries value chains, rather than final 
goods, and has been increasingly driven by domestic absorptive capacity (Castellacci, 2011; 
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Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Mowery and Oxley 1995; Kim 1998). Deep integration has 
contributed to this emergence of global value chains (GVCs) in which production is spread 
across various countries or, to put it differently, to a larger role for intra-industry trade. 
UNCTAD (2013) estimates that now 60% of global trade is in intermediate goods and services. 
Trade is a critical element of global integration but FDI play a special role in the 
development of host economies because as a factor input, foreign investment can generate 
significant spillover benefits horizontally across the industry (Haskel et al., 2007) and vertically 
up and down the supply chain (Javorcik, 2004.)  
FDI is important for economic growth and efficiency, because the entry of foreign firms in 
the domestic market increases competition and shores up technological innovation both in 
terms of product and process (Alfaro et al., 2004). It also puts pressure simultaneously on their 
direct domestic competitors, but also on upstream and downstream firms (Mastromarco and 
Simar, 2015). Importantly, FDI entails the diffusion of frontier management practices (Bloom 
et al., 2012). FDI is often conceived as more resilient than other international capital flows 
(portfolio investment, for instance) and importantly may exhibit complementarity patterns not 
only with respect to international trade, but also with other elements of financial globalization 
(Greenaway and Kneller 2007, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008).  
Our empirical analysis follows the literature in being based on the gravity model; a staple 
of international economics (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003). The gravity theory and related 
econometric framework was originally developed for international trade flows, but has also 
been applied to FDI flows and integration effects (Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Anderson, 2011).  
The seminal paper in the modern econometric evaluation of free trade area agreements 
literature on the basis of a gravity model is Baier and Bergstrand (2007). This paper is one of 
the first to make the point that moving away from a cross-section design to one based on panel 
data was necessary in order to deal with endogeneity bias (see also Baier and Bergstrand, 2004; 
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Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004). 
Moreover, this literature generates a number of valuable estimates of the economic benefits 
of deep vis-à-vis shallow integration. For instance, Baier et al. (2008) estimate that membership 
in the European Union leads to increases in bilateral international trade of the order of between 
127 and 146% in 10 to 15 years after joining. This compares favourably with equivalently 
estimated benefits from shallow integration as they also find that membership in the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) generates increases in bilateral trade that are of about one 
quarter of the size of those generated from deep integration agreements (such as the EU and 
the EEA.) EFTA effects are estimated at only about 35% over the 10 to 15-year period 
following the start of membership.   
There has also been important research on individual aspects of deep integration on FDI 
inflows. Of interest in our case is the role of deepening monetary integration (for instance, by 
using a single currency) in affecting trade and FDI inflows. De Sousa and Lochard (2011) is 
particularly relevant in this respect because they investigate whether the creation of the euro 
(in the context of the European Monetary Union, EMU) in 1999 explain the sharp increase in 
inter-European investment flows. They tackle this question using a gravity model for bilateral 
foreign direct investment (FDI). Their main finding is that the euro increased intra-EMU FDI 
stocks by around 30% percent. More importantly, they find evidence that this effect varies over 
time and across EMU members: it is significantly larger for outward investments of less-
developed or poorer EMU members.  
There has also been an important stream of studies from a regional economics perspective, 
of which a good example is that of Basile et al. (2008). This paper uses panel firm-level data 
over the period 1991–1999 covering more than 5500 foreign subsidiaries in 50 regions of eight 
different EU countries. The methodology they use is the mixed logit location choice model, 
which allows the investigation of the effects of EU regional policy (Structural Funds) in the 
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location choice of foreign subsidiaries. Their main conclusion is that, accounting for 
agglomeration economies and various regional and country-level characteristics, those regional 
policy instruments are found to be an effective factor in explaining FDI location. Although the 
eligibility criteria for EU regional assistance funds is slightly restrictive (only regions with per 
capita income below 70% of the EU average qualify), evidence of this positive effect provides 
an additional reason why we might expect an FDI premium from EU membership.  
One important additional issue to investigate is the complex relationship between 
international trade and FDI flows. This has been traditionally framed in terms of tariff-jumping 
FDI decisions (Motta, 1992) and has gained further impetus with recent work on heterogeneous 
firms. Helpman et al. (2004) put forward a multi-country, multi-sector general equilibrium 
model that highlights the decision of heterogeneous firms to sell in foreign markets either 
through exports or through a local subsidiary based on FDI. Econometric evidence for the 
model is presented focusing on US affiliate sales and US exports in 38 countries and 52 sectors. 
Two particularly salient findings for the impact of` deep integration are (1) strong negative 
effects on export sales relative to FDI from sector and country-specific transport costs and 
tariffs and (2) strong support for the effects of firm-level heterogeneity on the relative export 
and FDI sales with greater firm heterogeneity found to lead to significantly more FDI sales 
relative to export sales.  
A more recent take on this issue is analysed in Conconi et al. (2016), which looks at 
how uncertainty affects firms' internationalization choices in terms of the trade-off between 
exports and FDI. The main novel idea in this case is the possibility that a solution to the trade-
off is found in the dynamics of this choice, in particular, on the possibility that firms initially 
choose to export in order to learn about the market and the country and, once learning takes 
place, they may choose to substitute these exports by investing directly. In other words, firms 
may export before investing in foreign markets so that the trade-off is not rigid and actually 
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may be resolved over time. The theoretical framework they put forward is centred on the notion 
that firms are uncertain about their profitability in a foreign market and thus experiment via 
exports before engaging in FDI.  Conconi et al. (2016) find support for this prediction of long 
term complementarity between trade and FDI in that the probability that a firm starts investing 
in a foreign country significantly increases with its export experience in that country. Hence 
one might expect that long-term institutions promoting deep economic integration might have 
a positive impact on both trade and FDI by amplifying this complementarity. 
2.2 The Gravity Model 
Although the gravity model started out as a purely empirical model, it has now been given solid 
theoretical foundations to explain cross country trade patterns. Maybe the simplest way to 
derive theoretically the gravity equation for trade is to impose a market-clearing condition on 
an expenditure equation. We follow Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) and, using CES preferences 
for differentiated varieties, write the expenditure equation as    
𝜗𝜗𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 ≡ �
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜
𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜
�
1−𝜎𝜎
𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜 (1) 
where the left-hand side represents total spending in country d on a variety produced in country 
o (d for destination, o for origin), pod is the consumer price in country d of a variety produced
in country o, pd is the price index of all varieties in country d, σ is the elasticity of substitution 
among varieties (assumed greater than 1) and Ed is the total consumer expenditure in the 
destination country. 
Profit maximization by producers in country o yields pod=µodmoτod where µod is the 
optimal mark-up, mo is the marginal cost, and τod represents bilateral trade costs. Assuming 
monopolistic or perfect competition, the mark-up is identical for all destinations. For the case 
of Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition, the mark-up is σ/(σ-1) which means that consumer 
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prices in country i are poo= (σ/(σ-1)) moτoo and τoo =1 if we assume there are no 
internal/domestic barriers. Assuming symmetry of varieties for convenience and summing over 
all varieties yields 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1−𝜎𝜎 𝜏𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1−𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜1−𝜎𝜎 𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜 (2) 
where Vod is the aggregate value of the bilateral trade flow from origin to destination and no is 
the number of varieties produced in origin and sold in destination.   
The market-clearing condition requires that supply and demand match: when summing 
equation (2) over all destinations (including own sales) is equal to the country total output (Yo). 
The condition can then be stated as 
𝑌𝑌𝑜𝑜 = 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1−𝜎𝜎 ∑ 𝜏𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1−𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜1−𝜎𝜎𝑜𝑜 𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜 (3) 
and solving it yields  𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1−𝜎𝜎 = 𝑌𝑌𝑜𝑜/Ω𝑜𝑜where Ω𝑜𝑜is an index of market-potential.  Substituting 
this market-clearing condition on the expenditure function yields the gravity equation: 
𝑉𝑉𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 = 𝜏𝜏𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜1−𝜎𝜎 𝐸𝐸𝑜𝑜 𝑌𝑌𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜1−𝜎𝜎  Ω𝑜𝑜       (4)
For the econometric implementation of (4), Ed is proxied by the destination (host) 
country’s GDP, Yo is proxied by the origin (source) country’s GDP, 𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜1−𝜎𝜎  Ω𝑜𝑜 is the multilateral 
trade resistance term, and τ is proxied by bilateral distance. The intuitive interpretation of the 
model is easy to visualise: bilateral trade is a positive function of the size of the economies of 
the two trade partners and a negative function of the distance between them. However, one 
cannot apply a parallel argument to derive a gravity model for FDI, because as a factor input 
one cannot aggregate across product markets in the same way. Hence, while there is a 
theoretical derivation of the gravity model for trade, currently the assumed relationship is 
empirical for the FDI gravity equation (Anderson, 2011).  
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3. Reduced Form Model
 The gravity equation model for FDI in the empirical literature parallels equation (4) above for 
trade in the following way: 
ln(bilateral flow of FDIo,d,t) = α0 +α1lnXo,t + α2lnXd,t + It + 𝜂𝜂o,d + uo,d,t  (5) 
where ln(.) stands for a natural logarithm of a unidirectional flow and the Xo,t is a vector of 
characteristics of the origin country, o, in year t. Similarly, Xd,t is a vector of destination nations’ 
characteristics in year t. As for trade these include measures of the size of the economy (GDP) 
of the countries as well as indicators of time-varying economic distance.  
However, many of the key host and home economy variables in a gravity equation, 
including almost all potential indicators of distance (transportation costs, cultural affinity, 
geography, etc.), common borders, landlocked countries, ocean harbors, lack of mountains, 
tariffs, customs, different language/money, regulation, legal origin, are either invariant or do 
not change greatly over time for each pair (dyad) of countries. For these reasons, we instead 
include a dyadic fixed effect (𝜂𝜂o,d), a dummy variable for each pair of countries. The 
coefficients of interest, the variable indicating deeper ties of integration such as the EU 
membership are identified from the impact of changes in trading/economic/political 
relationships (and other economic variables) over time on the change in FDI flows over time. 
Being a member of the EU will be one of the time-varying observable characteristics of a 
country that enter the Xo,t and Xd,t vectors of characteristics specific to a country and will include 
things like time-varying pair proxy for trade/investment costs and time-varying regulatory 
cultural distance. We also include a full set of time dummies to control for global 
macroeconomic shocks. The uo,d,t is the idiosyncratic error term. The standard errors are 
clustered by dyadic pair to allow for serial correlation of the errors.  
In short, our modelling strategy to explain the impact of deep economic integration on 
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FDI follows the structural gravity approach; a similar specification is used for example by 
Baier and Bergstrand (2007). In terms of estimation method, we first estimate a baseline model 
using the natural logarithm of bilateral unidirectional FDI flows; second, we estimate a Poisson 
model (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). In all cases, we control for dyadic fixed effects and 
time dummies. The inclusion of bilateral fixed effects helps to minimise the effects of the 
exclusion of many of the usual suspects in explaining FDI flows. They control for country pair 
unobserved heterogeneity and implicitly for factors such as cultural distance, bilateral 
regulatory agreements, etc. The usual concern regarding omitted variable bias is mitigated in 
this way in these types of models. Year fixed effects are also important as they reflect the macro 
phenomena that are common across all country-pairs.  
In our sensitivity analysis, we also address the following selection problem. Suppose 
that the OLS and Poisson regressions are biased by the inclusion of ‘positive only’ data of 
bilateral FDI flows. 41% of the observations are zero and the OLS model traditionally deals 
with this by giving a value of $1 of FDI to the missing value so we can take logarithms. But 
this is arbitrary and the fact that there are no bilateral trade flows between two countries may 
be telling us about the sunk costs of doing business between the dyad of countries. We try to 
address this issue via a Heckman selection model in which we first estimate a selection equation 
in which the likelihood of non-zero flows is modelled as a function of manufacturing, exports 
and import shares as well as per capita GDP of the destination country. As discussed in detail 
below, the selection equation generates some interesting lessons: a higher likelihood of positive 
FDI flows is related to lower per capita GDP (i.e. FDI goes to countries where the return to 
capital is higher), higher industry shares (i.e. a signal of better integration in the global value 
chain), lower export shares (which might indicate a substitution effect between FDI and trade) 
and higher import shares (countries more depended on international factor and goods 
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movements) in the destination country.1 
We undertake a number of additional robustness tests on our estimate of the impact of 
deep economic integration on FDI, using stock rather than flow measures of foreign investment 
and considering dynamic specifications as well as lag structures. We also consider the impact 
of other integrative institutions such as the EEA and EFTA. Finally, we turn to the simultaneous 
effects of deeper integration on trade and FDI together estimating two equations jointly using 
seemingly unrelated regression analysis to identify the separate impacts of EU membership on 
both variables. 
4. Data
Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident 
entity in one economy (“direct investor”) in an entity resident in an economy other than that of 
the investor (“direct investment enterprise”). The lasting interest implies the existence of a 
long-term relationship between the direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree 
of influence on the management of the enterprise. In general, direct investment involves both 
the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital and income 
transactions between them. As far as measurement accounting is concerned, FDI flows record 
the value of cross-border transactions related to direct investment during a given period of time. 
Financial flows consist of equity transactions, reinvestment of earnings, and intercompany debt 
transactions. On the one hand, outward flows represent transactions that increase the 
investment that investors in the reporting economy have in enterprises in a foreign economy, 
such as through purchases of equity or reinvestment of earnings, less any transactions that 
1 We note that the lambda term is significant and negative, suggesting that the error terms in the 
selection and primary equations are negatively correlated so the selection equation is needed. 
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decrease the investment that investors in the reporting economy have in enterprises in a foreign 
economy, such as sales of equity or borrowing by the resident investor from the foreign 
enterprise. On the other hand, inward flows represent transactions that increase the investment 
that foreign investors have in enterprises resident in the reporting economy less transactions 
that decrease the investment of foreign investors in resident enterprises. In our data, we look 
directly at unidirectional and bilateral FDI flows (inflows for one country and outflow for the 
other) in millions of current US dollars. We used the OECD International Direct Investment 
Statistics as our primary data source.2 It includes data on FDI into and out of OECD countries 
according to the benchmark definition, 3rd edition. In this paper, we focus on FDI inward flows 
and in our sensitivity analysis on FDI stocks from the same dataset3. For the purpose of 
international comparison, we use millions of USD as currency units. The FDI data was merged 
with World Bank data4 on macroeconomic indicators of these OECD countries including GDP 
and GDP per capita (USD, PPP). Furthermore, as required by the Heckman model set-up, we 
calculated the share of manufacturing output as percentage of total GDP, the share of export as 
percentage of total GDP, and the share of imports as percentage of total GDP from the World 
Bank dataset.   
We constructed our key variable of interest for deeper economic integration, EU 
2 The data are available online and can be accessed here: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/bmd3-data-en 
3 Some FDI flows are negative sign. These instances of disinvestment arise because either equity 
capital, reinvested earnings or intra-company loans) are negative and not offset by the remaining 
components. Negative flows have real economic meaning, and, because of their numerical 
importance, we cannot eliminate them without losing consistency, so we treat them as zero. 
4 WDI Database Archives (WDI-DA): http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=wdi-
database-archives-(beta) 
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membership, on information provided on the European Union website.5 Our EU membership 
variable is a binary time-variant variable equal to 1 if the country is in the EU at a specific year, 
0 if the country is not in the EU at that year.  The list of variables used in this paper is provided 
in Table 1. In our dataset, each observation contains information of FDI flows into the target 
country, EU membership status of both target and source countries, macroeconomic conditions 
of both target and source countries, and other relevant information such as if they are in other 
multilateral agreements.  
We conducted our research within the OECD framework, primarily because the 
international capital markets are well established between OECD countries allowing for the 
comparative analysis of bilateral FDI flows. Such data are rare or non-existent for developing 
and emerging markets over a reasonable period of time. The main disadvantage of our dataset 
is therefore the exclusion of most developing countries including China and India. Notice that 
a by-product of this drawback is that we are limited in the currency unions we can study (for 
example, vis-à-vis Glick and Rose, 2015). On the other hand, bilateral FDI flows within OECD 
accounts for 70% of global FDI inflows. Also, the data are easily available for those countries 
with reassuring quality standards. The 34 OECD countries included are Austria, Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, 
Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, UK and the USA. “Target/destination” indicates the country which is the 
recipient of the FDI and “Source/origin” indicates the country is the sender of the FDI.  
As far as the time span is concerned, we used all available years covered by the database 
(3rd edition), from 1985 to 2013. The maximum possible number of observations is 
5 https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en 
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34*33*29=32,538. We constructed our data as a balanced panel with assigned zeros due to 
missing values (no flows). For many country-year pairs, especially before the 1980s, bilateral 
FDI flows were in fact zero. The missing values for FDI in the data reflect these zeros and as 
explained above we used the Pseudo Poisson Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator (Santos 
Silva and Tenreyro, 2006; WTO, 2012) and Heckman selection model to address the non-
random assignment of zero FDI flows. For missing values in other variables, we imputed the 
mean together with a missing dummy to flag the imputation. Basic statistics are provided in 
Table 2, which has the mean, standard deviation, minimum value, and maximum value of each 
variable.  
5. Empirical Analysis
5.1 Benchmark-Baseline Specification 
Table 3 shows estimates of the gravity equation (5) with the dependent variable being bilateral 
FDI flows. We compare the baseline panel FE estimator with the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum 
Likelihood (PPML) model for two main reasons: the current stage in the evolution of modelling 
gravity equations is the PPML estimator (for an account of the advantages see Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006); we do not exclude from the data the 0 bilateral flows observations (see 
description section) and the PPML estimator can deal well with the highly right-skewed nature 
of the distribution of flows due the presence of many 0’s. We analyse the regressors in order. 
The size of the two countries is measured by GDP and the level of development is measured 
by GDP per capita. First of all, the size of both sender and target matters for FDI, as we would 
expect in a standard gravity estimation, and exert a positive and significant effect on FDI flows. 
The level of development is significant only for the sender, and even this result is not robust to 
the PPML estimation. 
However, the main variable of interest for our present purposes is the one capturing 
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deep economic integration via the effect of EU membership, namely the estimated coefficients 
for the EU target dummy for the host economy. This takes a value between 33% and 38% for 
the Panel FE and PPML estimator, respectively. These coefficients are statistically significant. 
On the baseline OLS estimate of column (1) the effect is 33% being calculated as e0.285-1, in 
the Poisson model of column (2) it is 38%= e0.32 - 1.   
5.2 Sensitivity and Robustness Analysis 
We subject the baseline estimation results to four demanding alternative specifications and 
estimation methods in order to test the robustness of our results concerning the impact of EU 
membership on FDI. These are replacing FDI flows by the stock of FDI as the dependent 
variable in equation (5); exploring the effects of gradual adjustment to EU membership through 
a distributed lag structure; using a difference model to tackle potential serially correlated errors; 
and addressing possible sample selection bias through a Heckman procedure. We report and 
discuss these results in the sub-sections below. 
5.2.1 FDI stocks instead of flows as dependent variable 
Information about FDI is available both as flow and stock data and is recorded in a country’s 
Financial Account of the Balance of Payments (BOP) or International Investment Position (IIP), 
respectively. The inward FDI stock is the value of foreign investors' equity in and net loans to 
enterprises resident in the reporting economy. FDI stocks are therefore the (revalued) 
accumulation of past flows, while flows are the current transactions taking place in a certain 
period t. We should note here that FDI flows are generally not equal to the first difference of 
FDI stocks because revaluation, currency fluctuations and other factors. 
FDI stock data has been used in the literature because it is more stable than flow data 
(Beugelsdijk et al., 2010), which can be subject to large annual fluctuations, and has the 
advantage that FDI stock are unlikely to be negative. In our case, the latter points mean we end 
up with more observations. However, there are specification problems with estimating our 
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equations using bilateral FDI stocks as dependent variable because the data series for the 
independent variables are flow variables; FDI inflows are therefore more coherent with the 
theoretical derivation of the structural gravity model. 
Table 4 reports estimates of the bilateral FDI stock equation replicating Table 3 in using 
both panel fixed effects and Poisson estimation methods. As we would expect given the 
arguments above, the gravity model provides a less satisfactory explanation of FDI stocks than 
flows; indeed, the source and host GDP variables are not significant in the Poisson estimates 
and only source GDP in the fixed effects model. Even so, we continue to obtain a significant 
and positive estimated impact of EU membership of 0.34 from the Poisson regression.  
5.2.2 Adjustment effects and distributed lags 
The effects of deep economic integration may not be felt contemporaneously. Indeed, the 
impact could be gradual, or anticipated prior to EU membership. These possibilities led us   to 
explore the effects of lagged EU membership dummies on FDI inflows. In this regression 
model, FDI inflows are the dependent variable and EU membership and other independent 
variables have been lagged. Our specifications include up to the fourth lag effects, and one 
forward effect. The estimates of the lagged EU coefficients are presented in Table 5.  
The coefficients of FDI target country EU membership dummies in columns (1) to (4) 
demonstrate a stable long-term positive effect of EU membership on FDI inflows, which is 
more than 1.5 times larger than our baseline specifications. For column (5), because we have a 
forward term, the first lead dummy represents the long-term positive effect, which is also 
significant and positive.  
We also find that by adding up the coefficients of contemporaneous and lagged term 
of EU membership (target), the baseline overall impact can be gauged as a sum of between 
16 and 18% which is a more conservative estimate than we have shown above. 
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5.2.3 First-differencing 
When unobserved heterogeneity in FDI flows is temporally correlated, first-differencing the 
data offers clear advantages as an alternative estimator. This is because the panel fixed effects 
estimator is inefficient when t is large enough, if the errors are highly serially correlated. We 
do incur this risk, because the year data points range from 1985 to 2013.  First differences 
might therefore be a more appropriate estimation technique when the randomness tends to be 
correlated over time, while fixed-effects, as reported in Table 3, might be more appropriate 
when randomness tends to dissipate between periods. In the trade literature, the former is often 
used due to the higher ‘persistent’ nature of data, but this is less clear-cut with FDI data. In 
other words, we use the first-differencing model to check if the time pattern could undermine 
our results from baseline model.  
Hence, we estimate equation (6); the gravity equation in first differences: 
dln(bilateral flow of FDIo,d,t-(t-1)) = α1dlnXo,t-(t-1) + α2dlnXd,t-(t-1)  + vo,d,t-(t-1)  (6) 
We then rewrite the equation when we drop the GDP and GDP per capita from the regression 
and focus on the EU variables for the sender (o) and the target (d) only, now vo,d,t-(t-1)=  uo,d,t- 
uo,d,(t-1) being a white noise 
log(1+FDI)t - log(1+FDI)(t-1) = α1EUo,t-(t-1) + α2EUd,t-(t-1)  + α3EUo,(t-1)-(t-2) + α4EUd,(t-1)-(t-2)  + 
α5EUo,(t-2)-(t-3) + α6EUd,(t-2)-(t-3)  +  uo,d,t- uo,d,(t-1)        (7) 
This specification has the advantage of eliminating the effects of possible auto-
correlated disturbances, controlling at the same time for heterogeneity. Compared to standard 
fixed effects, first differencing removes by construction both source and target country dyadic 
effects, so that they are no longer identified.  
The results are reported in Table 6. We again find consistently significant and positive 
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estimates of the impact of EU target on FDI inflows in these specifications, the coefficients 
ranging from 0.299 to 0.509. Hence our findings still hold after taking into consideration of 
auto-correlation over time. The ATE (average treatment effect) is calculated in the last line of 
the table, being the sum of all statistically-significant EU target coefficients. 
5.2.4 Sample selection bias and Heckman estimation 
We noted above that for some pairs of countries, no data are reported on bilateral FDI flows. 
The common practice in the literature seems to be recoding the missing values to zero and then 
simply ignoring these observations by estimating the gravity model on dyads which report 
strictly positive (and higher than 1) FDI flows (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). 
Alternatively, other papers substitute missing/zero values with an arbitrarily small constant so 
that the natural log of these observations is defined and log-computable (Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006). There is no entirely satisfactory solution to this problem since the missing 
values could be due to the fact that FDI is truly zero, or because it is non-zero and it is measured 
with error but relatively small and escapes statistical reporting or because it is non-reported for 
other unknown reasons. However, in all these cases, the estimation can lead to biased 
coefficients’ estimates due to sample selection. 
The Heckman sample-selection model works by estimating the determinants of being 
selected into the sample simultaneously with estimating the determinants of the levels of FDI 
flows for the dyads selected into the sample because they are non-zero. We therefore re-
estimate the model for FDI inflows reported in Table 3 using the inverse Mills-ratio, with the 
results reported in Table 7.  
This procedure considerably reduces the estimated size of EU membership effect on 
FDI but not its significance. The effect is now estimated to be 14% (= e0.13-1). In the selection 
equation, we have used three ‘excluded’ variables from the target database, manufacturing 
Value Added/GDP, export/GDP, import/GDP.  
19 
Concerning these, three comments are in order. First, the manufacturing value added 
over GDP variable signals a positive selection into the sample, meaning that target countries 
with bigger manufacturing share as a percentage of GDP tend to also experience positive (vis-
à-vis none) FDI inflows. Second, the trade pattern in the target countries works in two 
directions, with exports having a negative and imports a positive selection effect for non-zero 
FDI flows. Finally, and most importantly, the coefficient on the inverse Mills-ratio is positive 
indicating positive selection; this means that, without the correction, the estimate of the impact 
would have been upward-biased. 
5.3 Alternative scenarios 
We consider two further extensions to our framework. We first analyse the impact of joining 
the EU on FDI, having not previously been a member, rather than the average effect of EU 
membership as we did before. We also study the effects on FDI of membership in other 
economic integration structures rather than WTO membership as the alternative to EU 
membership. These might be realistic alternatives for countries either joining or leaving the 
EU, and as such might provide a more positive alternative scenario, therefore reducing the size 
of the EU membership effects.   
5.3.1 The effect of joining the EU  
In our sample, 11 countries joined the EU during the sampled period6, 13 countries were never 
6 These are Austria in 1995, Czech Republic in 2004, Spain in 1986, Estonia in 2004, Finland in 1995, 
Hungary in 2004, Poland in 2004, Portugal in 1986, Slovakia in 2004, Slovenia in 2004, and Sweden 
in 1995.  
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in the EU7, and 10 countries have always been a member in the period of our focus8. To 
investigate the joining effect of EU membership, we further restricted our sample to FDI flows 
between countries that joined EU between 1985 and 2013.  Table 8 reports the results for the 
three main methods of estimation of the base regression used in the paper; OLS, Poisson and 
Heckman methods respectively. It can be seen that the estimated effects of EU membership on 
FDI inflows for these countries are unambiguously larger than for all EU members as reported 
in Table 3.  Therefore, we have to be aware that we are not estimating the average treatment 
effects of EU membership on FDI, but a more specified “joining effect” of EU membership. 
5.3.2 Being a member of NAFTA & EFTA as an alternative to EU membership  
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 9  and North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)10 are two important ‘Free Trade Areas’ (FTAs), which include some of the OECD 
countries in our dataset. The reason why we might want to control for the membership to those 
FTA above and beyond EU is that so far, we have been implicitly treating the counterfactual 
to EU membership as the standard membership of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This 
might be an implausible hypothesis for some of the wealthy countries such as Norway (EFTA) 
and USA and Canada (NAFTA) within OECD economies. In Table 9, when we add these two 
dummy variables (both for the sender and recipient) the NAFTA and EFTA coefficients are 
statistically insignificant for the recipient and the EU recipient dummy, instead, remains 
positive and significant. This suggests that being a member of the EU matters even when 
7 These countries are Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, Israel, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Norway, New Zealand, Turkey, and USA.  
8  These countries are Belgium, Germany, Demark, France, Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, and the Netherlands. 
9 Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland.  
10 Canada, Mexico, and USA. 
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controlling for close alternatives. 
5.3.3 The effects of EU membership on FDI and trade; SUR methods 
Finally, we consider the effects of deeper economic integration through EU membership on 
trade and FDI jointly. We have established robustly the impact on FDI in a structural gravity 
model, and the literature has analysed extensively such models for trade and EU membership 
(Baier and Bergstrand, 2007;  Dhingra et al. 2017 ). Our approach is to use seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) modelling to estimate structural gravity models on FDI and trade data jointly. 
For FDI, we will estimate our baseline fixed effect specification. The trade equation is similar, 
but as we have already noted, trade equations do not typically control for GDP per capita. This 
is because FDI equations capture cross country flows in a factor input, which is argued to be 
sensitive to levels of development in the host economy and the economic distance between the 
home and host economy. The factors are not considered to be of comparable relevance in 
modelling flows in goods markets. Thus, the trade equation does not contain GDP per capita 
of the source and host economy. We estimate a SUR gravity model for both FDI-imports and 
FDI- exports and the results are reported in Table 10. 
The findings for GDP of the home and host economies as well as GDP per capita are 
as expected and conform to the literature. We focus primarily on the estimated effects of deeper 
economic integration. We identify positive effects on EU membership on both FDI and exports, 
and FDI and imports. The estimated FDI effects are similar when estimated jointly with both 
imports and exports, and somewhat smaller than in our FDI only regressions, though still 
positive and significant. However, the trade effects of EU membership are somewhat larger, 
and more marked for exports than imports. The effect is in fact 13% for FDI (vis-à-vis 29% for 
import) in the first SUR model and 14% for FDI (vis-a-vis 41% for export) in the second SUR 
model.  
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6. Conclusions
How much additional FDI does a country receive as a consequence of being a member of the 
European Union? This is obviously an important question for which, surprisingly, one still 
finds very few answers. After showing how the structural gravity model can be theoretically 
derived and empirically tested (vis-à-vis other major contributions in the literature), we report 
our findings that EU membership increases FDI inflows by between 14% and 38% depending 
on the choice of econometric technique. We find that, between 1985 and 2013, EU membership 
led FDI inflows to be greater, on average, by about 28%. We undertook a thorough and 
systematic robustness analysis of these estimates via four further checks. First, we looked at 
the data on FDI stock instead of flows; the literature has suggested that stock data might also 
have some empirical advantages. We do not find that the use of FDI stock versus flows alters 
our findings about the impact of EU membership, indeed they are mostly reinforced in the 
Poisson estimation. Next, we looked at the possibility that impact of EU membership on FDI 
might not be instantaneous, but rather subject to either forward or backward lags. We find 
evidence for such lagged effects which actually strengthen our proposition about the effects of 
EU membership and confirm that the EU membership ‘expectations’ build up until the year of 
joining and then beyond the date of membership. We went on to look at an alternative 
specification model, first differencing, to address potential problems of serial correlation and 
we continue to find confirmation of our baseline results concerning the impact of EU 
membership on FDI. Finally, we sought to address potential sample selection bias in the data, 
which may arise because the pattern of missing or zero flows is not random; hence our models 
would ‘select’ only countries which are prone to have bilateral FDI. We show that this selection 
effect is relevant and leads us to overstate the impact of EU membership, but deeper economic 
integration is still found to have a positive and significant impact on FDI. We next performed 
two extensions to the framework. In the first, we exclude all countries that are always or never 
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members, hence focusing on the effects of joining the EU rather than being a member of it. The 
impact of joining the EU in our sample period is found to be larger than the effects of 
membership more generally.  Secondly; we introduce other possible routes to economic 
integration namely membership of EFTA and NAFTA as the alternative to EU membership, 
rather than (implicitly) WTO rules. The impact of EU membership on FDI is not changed 
significantly by this adjustment. 
Finally, we build on our structural gravity equation framework to consider the effects 
of EU membership on FDI and trade jointly. We estimate two systems of equations; FDI and 
imports, and FDI and exports, respectively. We find that deep economic integration such as 
developed within the EU has the most marked effects on trade, but simultaneously does 
increase FDI significantly to a level within our original range of estimates.   
These results have enormous implications for the European integration project and for 
countries like the UK (and not exclusively), that are currently considering substantial changes 
of the terms of their relationship with the EU (Dhingra et al., 2016).  Countries that choose to 
leave the European Union may suffer significant falls in the inflows of foreign direct 
investment in addition to major disruptions to their trade flows. While the impact on trade will 
be perhaps twice as great, the effects on FDI are also large, in the order of 14 to 38%. This 
estimate is robust to the array of alternative methods and specifications outlined above. 
Furthermore, given the strong spillover effects from FDI to the host economy identified in the 
literature (see e.g.  Javorcik, 2004), this suggests that the broader economic effects of leaving 
a deeply integrated trade group such as the European Union might be considerable and 
negative. 
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Table 1:  List of Variables 
Definition Unit Source 
Bilateral FDI flow Inward FDI flows (sender to target) 
USD, 
Millions 
OECD 
database 
Bilateral FDI stocks Inward FDI Stocks (sender to target) 
USD, 
Millions 
OECD 
database 
GDP (sender) Total GDP of FDI sender 
USD, 
millions World Bank 
GDP (target) Total GDP of FDI target USD, millions World Bank 
GDP per capita (sender) GDP per capita of FDI sender USD, PPP World Bank 
GDP per capita (target) GDP per capita of FDI target USD, PPP World Bank 
EU member (sender) Sender country is EU member 0,1 EU website 
EU member (target) Target country is EU member 0,1 EU website 
Manufacturing share 
(target) 
Share of manufacturing 
output as percentage of 
total GDP 
% World Bank 
Export share (target) Share of export as percentage of total GDP % World Bank 
Import share (target) Share of import as percentage of total GDP % World Bank 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Bilateral FDI 
flows (inward) 32,538 385.57 3157.74 -59483.33 117839.40 
Bilateral FDI 
stock 32,538 3819.88 19102.98 -7346.23 486833.00 
Import 32,538 3156.96 12651.24 0.00 339074.10 
Export 32,538 3196.13 13315.90 0.00 353787.10 
GDP 32,538 878344.70 1885361.00 4075.01 16700000.00 
GDP per capita 32,538 24762.44 12632.88 3415.68 95587.31 
Manufacuring 
share of GDP 32,538 18.04 4.29 5.06 31.37 
Import/GDP 32,538 35.01 19.25 0.00 97.75 
Export/GDP 32,538 34.91 20.43 0.00 99.83 
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Table 3: Panel estimates of the effects of EU membership on FDI inflows 
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable:  Panel Fixed Effects PPML 
Dependent Variable: 
EU member (target) 0.285*** 0.320* 
(0.077) (0.163) 
EU member (sender) -0.01 0.828*** 
(0.079) (0.191) 
Ln(GDP, target) 0.473*** 3.799*** 
(0.056) (1.432) 
Ln(GDP, sender) 0.500*** 3.903*** 
(0.154) (1.462) 
Ln(GDP per capita, target) 0.18 -1.489 
(0.158) (1.513) 
Ln(GDP per capita, sender) 1.450*** -1.125 
(0.154) (1.623) 
Constant -25.208*** -27.125*** 
(2.958) (5.130) 
Observations 32,528 32,147 
R-Squared 0.470 0.423 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Bilateral FE Yes  Yes 
Clustered Country Pair Country Pair 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. Coefficients with 
standard errors (clustered by 630 bilateral country pair in first two columns) in brackets. All regressions 
include fixed effects for years and dyadic pair. Column (1) is estimated by OLS. Column (2) is estimated by 
Poisson PML. The 34 OECD countries included are Austria, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, UK and the US. “Target” indicates the country which is the 
recipient of the FDI and “sender” indicates the country is the sender of the FDI. 
30 
Table 4: FDI Stock as dependent variable 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
Panel Fixed Effects PPML 
logGDP(sender) 0.46807*** 1.02995 
0.0777 0.84138 
logGDP(target) 0.51009*** 1.14044 
0.07765 0.8587 
lnGDPPC(sender) 1.61543*** 2.86921*** 
0.14324 0.93212 
lnGDPPC(target) -0.0272 0.70833 
0.14671 0.91731 
EU member(sender) 0.0514 0.93230*** 
0.1076 0.16769 
EU member(target) 0.16581 0.34052*** 
0.1089 0.11255 
Constant -26.48975*** -63.14862*** 
2.03021 11.07743 
Observations 34,510 30,399 
R-squared 0.64802 0.83714 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Bilateral FE Yes Yes 
Clustered Paired Paired 
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Table 5. Panel Gravity Equation with Bilateral Fixed and Time Fixed Effects-with lags 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES log(1+FDI) log(1+FDI) log(1+FDI) log(1+FDI) log(1+FDI) 
EU member(target) 0.47750*** 0.48156*** 0.48485*** 0.47971*** 0.03956 
(0.11919) (0.13189) (0.13142) (0.13091) (0.11219) 
EU member(sender) -0.21377** 0.15597 0.13994 0.12660 0.16993 
(0.10610) (0.11888) (0.11864) (0.11832) (0.10385) 
lag1EU member(sender) 0.36161*** -0.24870** -0.25004** -0.25004** -0.25004** 
(0.09549) (0.11551) (0.11917) (0.11922) (0.11927) 
lag1EU member(target) -0.33219*** 0.04467 0.02608 0.02608 0.02608 
(0.10476) (0.12207) (0.12894) (0.12899) (0.12905) 
lag2EU member(sender) 0.58412*** 0.03422 0.02915 0.02915 
(0.09623) (0.11858) (0.12706) (0.12712) 
lag2EU member(target) -0.37082*** 0.00573 0.10340 0.10340 
(0.10916) (0.12750) (0.13333) (0.13339) 
lag3EU member(sender) 0.57328*** 0.03776 0.03003 
(0.10252) (0.11443) (0.11475) 
lag3EU member(target) -0.29740*** 0.41898*** 0.41000*** 
(0.11347) (0.13511) (0.13502) 
lag4EU member(sender) 0.55228*** 0.49703*** 
(0.11373) (0.11419) 
lag4EU member(target) -0.61537*** -0.65023*** 
(0.11680) (0.11627) 
lead1EU member(sender) -0.30928*** 
(0.11329) 
lead1EU member(target) 0.44527*** 
(0.12597) 
Joint F-test EU membership of recipients 
F 8.14000 7.21000 4.66000 7.75000 7.00000 
p-values 0.00030 0.00010 0.00100 0.00000 0.00000 
Constant 1.72163*** 6.04786*** 7.08343*** 7.15384*** 3.01739*** 
(0.20174) (0.04815) (0.20906) (0.20800) (0.17251) 
Observations 31,416 30,294 29,172 28,050 26,928 
R-squared 0.45249 0.45074 0.44865 0.44671 0.4602 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bilateral FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered pairid pairid paired paired Paired 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
32 
Table 6. First differenced panel gravity model 
VARIABLES log(1+fdi)[t-t(t-1)] log(1+fdi)[t-t(t-1)] log(1+fdi)[t-t(t-1)] 
D.EU member(target) t-(t-1) 0.29890*** 0.47226*** 0.45682*** 
(0.111) (0.124) (0.125) 
D.EU member(sender) t-(t-1) -0.19203* 0.04356 0.02877 
(0.107) (0.120) (0.121) 
LD.EU member(target) (t-1)-(t-2) 0.34448*** 0.47786*** 
(0.113) (0.129) 
LD.EU member(sender) (t-1)-(t-2) -0.36655*** -0.10008 
(0.112) (0.128) 
L2D.EU member(target) (t-2)-(t-3) 0.50283*** 
(0.113) 
L2D.EU member(sender) (t-2)-(t-3) -0.12123 
(0.111) 
Total ATE 0.30 0.82 1.44 
Observations 25,030 23,970 22,931 
R-squared 0.5354 0.54313 0.5499 
Clustered  Paired Paired paired 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
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Table 7: Panel estimates of the effects of EU membership on FDI inflows-Heckman selection 
Heckman 
Dependent variable: Ln(1+FDI) Dummy  1(FDI>0) 
EU member (target) 0.132*** 
(0.050) 
EU member (sender) 0.199*** 
(0.050) 
Ln(GDP, target) 0.686*** 
(0.226) 
Ln(GDP, sender) 0.766*** 
(0.226) 
Ln(GDP per capita, target) -0.01 0.230*** 
(0.255) (0.017) 
Ln(GDP per capita, sender) 1.655*** 
(0.254) 
Manufacturing value added/GDP 0.005*** 
(target) (0.002) 
Exports/GDP -0.013*** 
(target) (0.001) 
Imports/GDP 0.011*** 
(target) (0.002) 
Mills’ Ratio 1.043*** 
(0.164) 
Observations 32,528 32,528 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
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Table 8. Panel Gravity Equation with Bilateral Fixed and Time Fixed Effects-subsample 
Sample restricted to FDI recipient & sender  countries who join EU 
between 1985-2013 
OLS Poisson Heckman 
VARIABLES log(1+FDI) FDI_inflows log(1+FDI) 
Dummy 
1(FDI >0) mills 
logGDP(sender) 0.42764*** 0.39844 -1.03535 
0.07727 2.63172 0.676 
logGDP(target) 0.59833*** 0.46133 -0.91516 
0.10929 2.6268 0.6774 
lnGDPPC(sender) 2.18083*** 6.02201* 5.27941*** 
0.38417 3.15465 0.71058 
lnGDPPC(target) 0.05458 2.29574 1.35254* 0.34152*** 
0.35402 2.98444 0.72115 0.07218 
EU member(sender) 0.29005 0.08019 -0.26406* 
0.18231 0.37916 0.14001 
EU member(target) 0.78282*** 1.33315*** 0.39554*** 
0.16365 0.207 0.14735 
share of industry -0.03009*** 
0.00884 
share of export -0.02569*** 
0.00695 
share of import 0.03009*** 
0.0069 
lambda 0.46495 
0.37946 
Constant -35.10623*** -68.19177*** -45.98066*** -3.26563*** 
7.46116 12.70742 9.65016 0.80567 
Observations 3,509 3,480 3,509 3,509 3,509 
R-squared 0.4487 0.51735 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bilateral FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered pairid pairid No No No 
Notes: *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level and * at the 10% level. 
35 
Table 9: Panel estimates of the effects of EU membership on FDI inflows 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel Fixed Effects PPML Panel FixedEffects PPML 
Panel Fixed
Effects PPML 
VARIABLES logFDI FDI logFDI FDI logFDI FDI 
EU member (target) 0.31653*** 0.35245** 0.30984*** 0.50805*** 0.30414*** 0.52047** 
(0.07549) (0.16365) (0.07591) (0.16132) (0.09836) (0.21072) 
EU member (sender) -0.03757 0.79253*** -0.04699 0.65443*** -0.00523 1.18216*** 
(0.07742) (0.18803) (0.07653) (0.18366) (0.09599) (0.28196) 
NAFTA (target) -0.19621 -0.38983 -0.20947 -0.61373** 
(0.14140) (0.27098) (0.14177) (0.28089) 
NAFTA (sender) -0.21594 -1.11872*** -0.21004 -0.95284*** 
(0.14492) (0.3061) (0.14640) (0.33021) 
EFTA (target) -0.02428 -0.06165 
(0.14343) (0.30001) 
EFTA (sender) 0.11124 1.02931*** 
(0.14742) (0.37204) 
ln (GDP, target) 0.42705*** 3.80584*** 0.43231*** 5.20112*** 0.42817*** 5.26744*** 
(0.05254) (1.41892) (0.05259) (1.57988) (0.05288) (1.59064) 
ln (GDP, sender) 0.44033*** 3.90119*** 0.44673*** 5.37993*** 0.45188*** 5.47513*** 
(0.05401) (1.44654) (0.05365) (1.60983) (0.05417) (1.62015) 
ln(GDPPC, target) -0.40401*** -1.34307 -0.43776*** -3.16803** 
-
0.42763*** -3.27052** 
(0.13285) (1.42114) (0.13523) (1.61103) (0.14490) (1.65208) 
ln(GDPPC, sender) 0.92933*** -0.95913 0.89598*** -2.57925 0.85867*** -2.75735 
(0.13217) (1.52164) (0.13314) (1.70781) (0.13829) (1.73930) 
Observations 32,538 30,535 32,538 30,535 32,538 30,535 
R-squared 0.48208 0.4354 0.48228 0.44553 0.48236 0.45183 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bilateral FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered pairid pairid pairid pairid pairid pairid 
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Table 10: SUR Models 
FDI inflow Import FDI inflow Export 
VARIABLES logFDI Log(IM) logFDI Log(EX) 
logGDP_sendercon 0.54279*** 1.07595*** 0.52139*** 1.27347*** 
0.10202 0.02701 0.1017 0.03163 
logGDP_recipientcon 0.46585*** 1.06920*** 0.44566*** 1.57108*** 
0.10193 0.02704 0.10162 0.03177 
logGDPercapita_sendercon 1.42511*** 1.48426*** 
0.04478 0.04483 
logGDPercapita_recipientcon 1.48477*** 1.48426*** 
0.04482 0.04483 
EU Recipient 0.12489** 0.25311*** 0.12772*** 0.34140*** 
0.04953 0.01329 0.04953 0.01411 
EU Sender -0.15472*** 0.41270*** -0.16459*** 0.22626*** 
0.04967 0.01319 0.04968 0.01405 
Constant -28.61701*** -23.85910*** -28.58989*** -20.48800*** 
3.0882 0.82949 3.07894 0.64634 
Observations 25,113 25,113 25,109 25,109 
R-squared 0.46559 0.94236 0.46558 0.94697 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bilateral FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered pairid pairid pairid pairid 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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